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ARTICLES
DEMEANOR CREDIBILITY
Honorable James P. Timony
INTRODUCTION
Tony: Why are you arresting me?
Sheriff: Because we think you shot the store clerk.
Tony: I shot the store clerk!!!
Sheriff: You shot the store clerk?
Tony: I shot the store clerk!!!
Sheriff: I knew you'd confess.!
Witnesses may use irony or sarcasm to convey their meaning. Unfor-
tunately, the written transcript cannot reflect all of the subtleties of a
witness, such as an inflection of voice or a particular gesture that may
completely change the meaning of the testimony. Often the sincerity of
the witness may be observed only from the way the witness sounds or
looks.2 When the sheriff accused him of shooting the clerk, Tony ex-
+ Chief Administrative Law Judge, Federal Trade Commission. B.S., 1954, Ohio University;
LLB, 1959, Georgetown University Law Center; LLM, 1961, Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not intended to reflect any agency
position.
1. MY COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992) (dialogue between Tony and
the Sheriff at the time of Tony's arrest). Depending on how he expressed the words,
Tony was either confessing or expressing surprise and disbelief. A transcript of such dia-
logue-like the transcript of trial testimony or a deposition-"cannot give the look or
manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence
or precipitancy, his calmness or consideration[.]" Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d
Cir. 1946).
2. See Untermeyer v. Freund, 37 F. 342, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) ("A witness may con-
vince all who hear him testify that he is disingenuous and untruthful, and yet his testi-
mony, when read, may convey a most favorable impression."). Judging credibility by de-
meanor is a precept of human behavior well studied by philosophers and poets. See, e.g.,
DAVID J. LIEBERMAN, PH.D., NEVER BE LIED TO AGAIN 8 (1998) (displaying a Sigmund
Freud quote, in which Freud noted that "[h]e that has eyes to see and ears to hear may
convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with
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pressed disbelief because he, in fact, had not shot the clerk. A reading
however, of the transcript without the benefit of observing the accused's
demeanor may, however, give the fact-finder the impression that the ac-
cused has confessed. To fully judge the witness's testimony, the fact-
finder must see and hear the witness's demeanor.
Under our common law system of litigation, the trier of fact uses the
witness's demeanor to determine the truth of the testimony. In recent
years, psychologists have challenged the use of the witness's demeanor
as a test of credibility, suggesting that decisions of deceit should be made
dispassionately from transcripts of testimony rather than in the heat of
battle in the courtroom. This dispute is not new. It was at the heart of
the English struggle for supremacy between the equity courts (domi-
nated by the Church and King) and the common law courts (dominated
by Parliament and the Bar), and has continued in this country.
For hundreds of years, judges or juries4 have decided the credibility of
testimony5 on the demeanor of the witness,6 including the witness's ap-
his fingertips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore"); OSCAR WILDE, PICTURE OF
DORIAN GRAY 29 (Penguin Books 1982) ("It is only shallow people who do not judge by
appearances."). But see CHARLES DICKENS, HUNTED DOWN 176 (Peter Haining ed.,
1996) ("I have known a vast quantity of nonsense talked about bad men not looking you
in the face. Don't trust the conventional idea. Dishonesty will stare honesty out of coun-
tenance, any day of the week, if there is anything to be got by it."); John 7:24 (suggesting
that one should "[j]udge not according to the appearance").
3. Demeanor includes the facial expressions and body language of either a testify-
ing witness or a non-witness sitting in the courtroom. See United States v. Schipani, 293
F. Supp. 156,163 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969).
4. The fact-finder may include a trial judge in a bench trial, a jury, an administrative
law judge, or some other presiding official in judicial or administrative adjudicatory pro-
ceedings.
5. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1952) (noting that ob-
serving one's demeanor "confer[s] immense discretion on those who, in finding facts, rely
on oral testimony"). In the Federal courts in the nineteenth century, the fact-finder was
often unable to observe a witness's demeanor as "oral testimony in open court was not
required in equity litigation; indeed, for many years it was virtually banned." Id. (re-
marking that it was not until the Equity Rules of 1912 that suits in equity relied upon oral
testimony on a consistent basis).
6. Demeanor outside of the courtroom is also used to determine fault. See Rothgeb
v. United States, 789 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence of defendant's
demeanor during police interrogation was admissible against him). The facts of a flight of
the accused, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, and assumption of a
false name are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See Harrington v. Sharff,
305 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1962) (determining that leaving the scene of an accident was
admissible in a civil case); Kanner v. United States, 34 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1929)
(holding that evidence of the pendency of offer of reward and two-year nationwide fruit-
less search was admissible to prove flight and concealment).
In the olden time it was a popular superstition, that the corpse of the slain would
bleed afresh if touched by the murderer; and it was deemed almost conclusive of
guilt, that he who was charged with the murder refused to lay his finger on the
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pearance, attitude, and manner The process is subjective and difficult
to describe. Jurors usually do not have to elucidate the reasons for their
verdict, but the trial judge who specifies a negative physical characteristic
of the witness's demeanor risks reversal on appeal.8 Now, empirical
evaluations of credibility suggest that demeanor evidence lacks reliabil-
ity9 and that a better credibility result could be achieved by focusing on
the exact words used by the witness as recorded in the transcript of the
testimony.' °  .
Until the middle of the twentieth century, demeanor evidence was
covered in a large body of psychological literature and motivated insight-
ful discussions in older trial practice texts. Thereafter, the treatment of
body, or to take its hand. In recent years persons suspected of murder have
been required to touch the dead body; not because the old superstition was in-
dulged, bu[t] that its effect on them-the emotion produced and manifested-
could be observed.
Gassenheimer v. State, 52 Ala. 313, 317 (1875).
7. Katherine Shaver, If Looks Could Convict, Clark's Presence May Sway Jurors,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1999, at B1. Shaver illustrates the point in the context of the pres-
ent day jury in a criminal trial:
Although jurors are instructed to weigh a case strictly on the evidence, defense
lawyers say jurors also carefully watch a defendant, perhaps imagining whether
the person in front of them could have committed such horrible crimes. In other
words, jurors try to picture whether the person fits the part .... In a case that
relies almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, jury experts say, the defen-
dant's appearance and the vibes he sends to jurors are even more important. "If
the evidence is not as clear-cut, the jurors still have to make the same decision-
whether he's guilty or not guilty-but they'll have less hard evidence to go on,"
said Majorie Fargo, president of Jury Services Inc., an Alexandria-based jury
consulting firm. It's what Fargo calls the "subjective" and "subconscious" part
of how jurors reach a decision. "They'll have to piece it together themselves,
and they'll address the issue of whether he could have done it," Fargo said, de-
scribing a process that she said she has pieced together by interviewing jurors af-
ter they have returned their verdicts. "They'll think, 'Does he look like he could
have done it?' If they play completely by the rules, they shouldn't address that,
but human nature takes over, and they do talk about that," Fargo said.
Id.
8. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1933) (deciding that it was a
reversible error for the trial judge to tell the jury that "wiping" hands during testimony is
"almost always an indication of lying").
9. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity
of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1189
(1993) (discussing demeanor in the context of social science); Olin Guy Wellborn III,
Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991) ("[D]eception detection studies indi-
cate that many subjects can do better than chance in detecting falsehood.").
10. See Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1091 ("Transcripts are probably superior to live
testimony as a basis for credibility judgments because they eliminate distracting, mis-
leading, and unreliable nonverbal data and enhance the most reliable data, verbal con-
tent."); Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1203 (discussing Professor Wellborn's beliefs on the
level of control afforded demeanor evidence).
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demeanor evidence was common only in trial advocacy textbooks. It
was Professor Imwinkelried's 1985 thoughtful article that deplored the
paucity of the then current legal literature on demeanor evidence." Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried encouraged further research and writing about de-
meanor evidence, pointing out that the "witnesses' demeanor seemingly
determines the outcome of a large percentage of trials.' '12 After Profes-
sor Imwinkelried's article, the literature on demeanor increased with ar-
ticles usually criticizing the use of a witness's demeanor as a criterion of
credibility.
In addition to the fact-finder's use of demeanor in determining credi-
bility, literature has demonstrated that attorneys use demeanor in pre-
paring witnesses for court, in selecting juries, in examining witnesses, and
in the counsel's own dress, mannerisms, body language, and voice
modulation." This article will focus on the fact-finder's use of a witness's
demeanor in the context of determining credibility, and the history, na-
ture, actual use, and criticism of demeanor evidence. This article sup-
ports the use of demeanor (stated in behavioral conclusions rather than
physical descriptions) as a factor in determining witness credibility, and
suggests the feasibility of expert testimony14 on demeanor determinations
where demeanor evidence adduced at the trial is the sole factor which
11. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics, 9 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 186 (1985) (noting that the "leading evidence treaties" and "[m]ost
evidence casebooks" of the time were virtually silent on the role of witness demeanor).
Professor Imwinkelried attributes the recent lack of demeanor evidence coverage in legal
literature to fewer "swearing contests," or he-said, she-said scenarios between a plaintiff
and defendant. Id. at 233-34. Professor Imwinkelried argues that the lack of legal analy-
sis of demeanor evidence stems from the greater use of expert testimony, greater accept-
ability of polygraph evidence and psychiatric testimony on the issue of a witness's credi-
bility, and liberalized admissibility of opinion or reputation testimony probative of the
character of a witness. See id.
12. Id. at 234 (calling the lack of contemporary legal analyses of demeanor "deplor-
able").
13. For an example of literature written for courtroom lawyers on how to use psy-
chological principles to their advantage, see generally THOMAS SANNITO, PH.D. &
PETER J. McGOVERN, J.D, ED.D., COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS
(1985). In citing professional psychological opinions, Sannito and McGovern provide
practical insights on non-verbal communications. See generally id. at ch. 4 (stating that,
inter alia, people with enlarged pupils are compassionate and those with beady-eyes use
cold logic; a person who looks up and to the left while thinking is metaphorical and one
who looks to the right reasons logically; thin lips mean frugality; hands and feet are more
expressive than a face; and a low pitched voice indicates confidence, while a high pitched
voice reduces believability).
14. The standard for admissibility of scientific evidence includes specialized knowl-
edge that (1) will assist the fact-finder and (2) is derived by a scientific method so that it is
generally accepted by the scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-91 (1993) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702).
[Vol. 49:903
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may be used in deciding a vital issue in the case.
I. CREDIBILITY EVIDENCE
To effectively comprehend the role demeanor evidence plays in a trial,
it is necessary to understand its use as a part of the evidence of witness
credibility as a whole. At a trial, when witnesses testify about their
knowledge of what happened during an event at issue in the litigation,
their stories 6ften vary. In such a situation, it is the fact-finder who must
decide whom to believe. This decision often involves an evaluation of
the evidence presented on the credibility of each witness.
Credibility evidence may include the witness's opportunity and capac-
ity to observe and relate to the event, and his demeanor, bias, character,
and any prior inconsistent statements. In addition, contradiction of, or
support for, a witness's version of events by other evidence, and the
plausibility of the witness's version, fall within the scope of credibility
evidence."
A. Demeanor
As mentioned above, demeanor is often used as part of the evidence
probative of a witness's credibility. Generally, demeanor includes the
witness's dress, attitude, behavior, manner, tone of voice, grimaces, ges-
tures, and appearance. In other words, demeanor includes "all matters
which 'cold print does not preserve.' ' 16 Assessment of demeanor, there-
fore, depends upon direct observation of the witness."
This direct observation can be as powerful as it is simplistic. For ex-
ample, in one of renowned defense attorney Clarence Darrow's cases, a
key prosecution witness with a rather unappealing appearance was called
to testify. In a classic example of the use of demeanor evidence, Darrow
observed:
[The witness] was a squat, heavy-set man of medium height ....
His swollen face, bleary eyes, puffy eyelids, and reddish-purple
nose marked the habitual drunkard. His shaggy ... hair had
been stranger to brush or comb for so long as to have become
15. See Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.B. 453, 458 (1987); Tim Halla-
han, An Overview of Trial Evidence Techniques, PRAC. LITIGATOR 5, 21, 25-26 (1996)
(arguing, in a discussion on the relevancy of credibility evidence, that "[a] witness's credi-
bility is always at issue" in a trial).
16. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d
Cir. 1949); see also Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952) (acknowl-
edging the conduct, manner, and appearance that make up a witness's demeanor).
17. See Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.B. 129, 133 (1980), affd, 669
F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
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tangled and matted. His clothes ... were covered with dirt and
grease. His huge hands.., were covered with grime.
18
Darrow's cross-examination of the witness consisted only of his request
that the witness stand up and turn around for the jury.'
B. The Opportunity and Capacity to Observe and Narrate the Event
In addition to demeanor evidence, several other factors determine the
level of credibility afforded to a particular witness. Central to a witness's
credibility is the requirement that the witness qualified to testify about
relevant facts must have first hand knowledge of the subject matter of
the testimony, and the capacity to testify accurately. Personal knowl-
edge is an essential qualification of a witness, established by the witness's
opportunity to observe the event at issue.20 The witness's capacity to tes-
tify refers to the ability of the witness to observe and understand what
was seen and to narrate it intelligently.
2
'
C. Bias
Another form of evidence that is used to impeach a witness's credibil-
ity is that which constitutes bias. Bias describes the existence of a rela-
tionship between the witness and a party that may lead the witness to
slant testimony in favor of or against a party. If a witness's bias is es-
tablished and thus, the witness's credibility is called into question, the
18. Imwinkelried, supra note 11, at 226-27 (quoting Clarence Darrow).
19. Darrow's follow up statement was concise and effective: "That's all. I just
wanted the jury to get a good look at you." Id. at 227 (quoting Clarence Darrow).
20. See 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAW §
1005(f) (James H. Chadbourne ed., 1970) (suggesting that the inability of a witness to
have personal knowledge of that to which he is testifying "may be shown to discredit" the
witness).
21. See id. § 993 (recommending a method for testing a witness's capacity to testify
accurately); 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6097 (1990) (discussing capacity's impact on credibility). The admis-
sibility of evidence pertaining to capacity, although not explicitly directed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, is generally "implied by the relevance rules [Article IV] and Rule
607." 3A WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 993.
22. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). The witness's testimony, af-
fected by the bias, may work for or against the party. In Abel, the Court opined:
Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the wit-
ness' self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as
finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess
all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony.
The "common law of evidence" allowed the showing of bias by extrinsic evi-
dence, while requiring the cross-examiner to "take the answer of the witness"
with respect to less favored forms of impeachment.
[Vol. 49:903
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jury may view the subject matter of the testimony less favorably than if
the bias was left undisclosed to the fact-finder. 3
D. Character
In everyday life, we rely on our appraisal of a person's character in
judging one's behavior. In order to ascertain whether a person per-
formed an. alleged act, it is often useful to know what kind of person he
is. The trier of fact must ask himself if this particular person is the kind
of person who would do such an act. In deciding whether to believe his
story, we want to know his respect for truth and how fairly and accu-
rately he observes, recites and narrates the events in question.
At law, however, evidence about the character of a person to show
that it is consistent with conduct at issue in the litigation is generally not
admissible. 4 Yet, character evidence is admissible for alternative pur-
poses, specifically to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident., 21
Character evidence may be used to impeach a witness on the theory
that certain characteristics render that person more prone to testify un-
truthfully. For example, general evidence of the trait of truthfulness or
dishonesty of a witness is admissible on the issue of the credibility of the
testimony.6 This form of impeachment evidence may be established by
prior misconduct, including criminal convictions, or testimony that dem-
onstrates a reputation for, or an opinion of, untruthfulness.27
23. See id. at 51 (noting the possible effects on the trier of fact following a successful
showing of bias).
24. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). In discussing the inadmissibility of general character
evidence, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he inquiry is not rejected because charac-
ter is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so over-
persuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportu-
nity to defend against a particular charge." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-
76 (1948). The Federal Rules of Evidence do, however, allow character evidence of a
pertinent trait of either the accused or the victim in a criminal trial when such evidence is
offered by the accused or the prosecution to rebut such evidence presented by the de-
fense. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1)-(2).
25. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating that under these circumstances, evidence of other
crimes or bad acts are admissible).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 608. Columbia Law School Professor H. Richard Uviller finds
that the use of character evidence to prove a predisposition to perjury is a "complex and
dangerous" area of law that is "differently understood and differently applied from court-
room to courtroom." H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence:
Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993). Professor Uviller would
ban character impeachment. See id. at 831.
27. See FED. R. EvID. 609 (governing impeachment of a witness by evidence of
criminal conviction); FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (stating that character evidence attacking the
credibility of a witness, by either reputation or opinion testimony, is admissible if proba-
2000]
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E. Prior Inconsistent Statement
An attorney may impeach a witness by demonstrating that, on prior
occasions, the witness made statements that are inconsistent with the
witness's present trial testimony. These prior inconsistent statements are
not inadmissible hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted in the prior statement.2 Instead, an attorney of-
fers evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to show that the witness
says different things at different times and is therefore untrustworthy.
29
The presentation of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is not of-
fered to prove that the witness's present testimony is false, but that the
inconsistency raises doubt as to the truthfulness of any of the witness's
statements. °
F. Contradiction or Corroboration
Another issue of witness credibility arises in a situation where a party
denies facts asserted by a witness and offers evidence that tends to con-
tradict the witness's version. If the party attempts to use extrinsic evi-
dence to demonstrate the contradiction, the evidence must address a ma-
terial aspect of the impeached witness's testimony. Evidence
demonstrative of a contradiction raises an inference that a witness mis-
tive of truthfulness or dishonesty); see also 4 JACK B. WEINSTIEN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02[1] (Joseph M. McLauglin ed., 2d
ed. 1999) (discussing character evidence's relevance for impeachment of a witness's
credibility); WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 21, § 6115 (describing the conditions for the
admissibility of character evidence).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted").
29. See Uviller, supra note 26, at 782 (describing the impeachment of a witness
through evidence of a prior inconsistent statement).
30. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 34 (5th ed. 1999).
A witness's prior inconsistent statement may be either oral or written. See FED. R. EVID.
613(a) (stating that the witness's previous statement may be "written or not"). In the ex-
amination of a witness concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness, the
statement need not first be disclosed to the witness, but must be disclosed to opposing
counsel upon request. See id. It should be noted, however, that the witness must be af-
forded an opportunity to explain or deny any extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement. See id. 613(b).
31. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1000 (discussing the mechanics of contradic-
tion and its effect on a witness's credibility); 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 21, § 6096
(acknowledging that "[t]he credibility of a witness is attacked by contradiction when evi-
dence is introduced suggesting that a fact to which a witness testified is not true").
32. See 1 STRONG ET AL., supra note 30, § 45 (stating the general rule that a witness
may not be impeached through the use of extrinsic evidence of "collateral" facts); Uviller,
supra note 26, at 781 (discussing contradiction as a form of impeachment).
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taken about one fact also may be mistaken about other facts disclosed in
his testimony.33 A witness may, however, corroborate his testimony by
presenting consistent documents or statements. Contradicting or cor-
roborating evidence may be offered through oral testimony; however,
contradicting or corroborating documents, especially those written in the
ordinary course of business and not for litigation, are one of the best
sources of the truth.4
G. Plausibility
A determination of a witness's credibility often includes an evaluation
by the fact-finder of the likelihood of the event occurring in the manner
described in the testimony.35 Effective cross-examination challenges a
witness's testimony by looking for omission, embroidery, or implausibil-
ity." A skillful examiner may make even the honest witness hesitant,
confused or defiant,37 opening a question of the plausibility of the wit-
ness's story.38 Often, findings of plausibility may be based on the wit-
ness's demeanor.39
33. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27, § 607.06[1] (noting that contradict-
ing a witness's testimony may show the fact-finder that all of the testimony is "untrust-
worthy").
34. See opinions of Judge Welles and Judge Davidson in their summary of credibility
factors, infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
35. See Local 162, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 782 F.2d 839, 842-43 (9th Cir.
1986) (upholding an administrative law judge's credibility finding based on lack of candor
and inconsistency of a witness, who denied throwing a rock at a security guard at work
sites, but admitted spitting at drivers and carrying an object believed to be a baseball bat);
United States v. Marin, 761 F.2d 426, 434 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding a finding of a district
judge who, after observing the witness's demeanor and hearing her testimony, did "not
find it credible that a woman who has been in the country for nine years indicates that she
does not read and understand English"); Meyer v. United States Customs Serv., 18
M.S.P.B. 545, 546 (1984) (holding it improbable that appellant, a special agent trained in
criminal investigations, received government property from the custodian of the property
at its storage facility without knowing that it was government property).
36. See Uviller, supra note 26, at 782.
37. See id. at 783.
38. See id. at 784. In Professor Uviller's survey of district court judges, plausibility of
a witness's story, defined as "the factfinder's experience and familiarity with 'human na-
ture' and 'the real world"' was given a somewhat favorable rating as an indicator of wit-
ness credibility. Id. at 825 (noting that "[a] substantial plurality ... called it one of the
better indices" of credibility).
39. See In re Visx, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9286, at 141 (filed May 27, 1999) (on file
with Catholic University Law Review). Administrative Law Judge Levin stated that:
Having observed his appearance and demeanor at the hearing, I found that
Gholz is precise in his use of language, meticulous in his demeanor, and highly
skillful and nuanced in the presentation of his testimony. There is nothing hap-
hazard about him. While all things are possible, I am not persuaded, in this in-
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H. Weight of Credibility Factors
The applicability of the above seven credibility factors varies with the
facts of each case. Rarely are all factors used in determining any one
witness's credibility. In addition, the application of the factors vary in
weight, and from judge to judge."
In a survey conducted by Professor H. Richard Uviller of fifty-six fed-
eral judges studying the standards by which fact-finders determine the
credibility of witnesses, prior inconsistency and contradiction were used
most often.41 The use of demeanor to determine witness credibility also
ranked high.
Former National Labor Relations Board Chief Administrative Law
Judges, Mel Welles and David Davidson, surveyed trial judges and found
that the best credibility factors include changes in witness's behavior and
loss of poise when confronted by a new document, evasiveness, defen-
siveness, and rationalization.43 Such factors may be revealed, in part, by
stance, that he forgot to file an IDS in his client's interest, or that it never oc-
curred to him to file during the entire course of the prosecution.
Id. (citation omitted).
40. Continental Western European law, based on Roman canon law, as explained in
Tancred's treatise written around 1215, left less discretion in determining witness credi-
bility. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Dectector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 589 (1997).
In paraphrasing Tancred's treatise, Charles Donahue, Jr. noted that:
[T]he judge ought to attempt to reconcile their statements if he can. If he can-
not, then he ought to follow those who are most trustworthy-the freeborn
rather than the freedman, the older rather than the younger, the man of more
honorable estate rather than the inferior, the noble rather than the ignoble, the
man rather than the woman. Further, the truth-teller is to be believed rather
than the liar, the man of pure life rather than the man who lives in vice, the rich
man rather than the poor, anyone rather than he who is a great friend of the per-
son for whom he testifies or an enemy of him against whom he testifies. If the
witnesses are all of the same dignity and status, then the judge should stand with
the side that has the greater number of witnesses. If they are of the same num-
ber and dignity, then absolve the defendant.
Id. (citing Charles Donahue, Jr., Proof by Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval
England: An Imperfect Reception of the Learned Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 131 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981)).
41. See Uviller, supra note 26, at 825.
42. See id. In his article, Professsor Uviller reported the results of the survey of
judges:
Clear winners were internal inconsistency and external contradiction. Demeanor
fared somewhat less well, with ... most judges rating it somewhat better than
middling, tending toward "one of the better indices" which deserved at least the
importance that jurors usually ascribe to it. Character . . . was simply "one of
several factors that should be taken into account."
Id.; see also supra note 38 (quoting Professor Uviller's findings on plausibility).
43. Videotapes: Training Lectures (Judge Welles, 1984 and Judge Davidson, 1996)
(on file with the Office of Administrative Law Judges, National Labor Relations Board).
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the witness's behavior."4 The surveyed trial judges look for the interest
of the witness, inconsistencies in testimony, poor recollection or percep-
tion, demeanor, and plausibility where supported by independent evi-
dence, corroboration by documents or disinterested witnesses, and un-
disputed facts.45
There is no consensus on demeanor evidence. To understand why
some judges deprecate the use of demeanor to assess witness credibility
while others rank it high, an assessment of the history of live trials is im-
portant. The custom of weighing the truthfulness of witnesses based on
their conduct and appearance, the nature and description of demeanor,
and the actual use of demeanor in cases grew out of the live trial setting.
II. DEMEANOR EVIDENCE
Demeanor evidence of the witness's credibility, such as some evidence
of the witness's character and capacity to observe and narrate accurately,
and the plausibility of the testimony, includes the witness's attitude, ap-
44. See id.
45. Judge Davidson summarized his view of credibility determinations:
[I]n most cases, I would start by looking at the undisputed facts and what has
been established by documents .... I generally regard a witness' interest or lack
of interest in the outcome of the case as important and employee witnesses who
have no interest in the outcome, but testify against their employer's interests, of-
ten get a point up from me for that. I look at inconsistencies next and try to
weigh their importance and to determine what may be due to poor recollection
or perception and what may not. In this regard, I find the old maxim "false in
one, false in all" generally unappealing. If I become convinced that a witness
has lied deliberately, I am inclined to discredit that witness in all respects except
where corroborated. But if I am convinced that I can't credit a portion of the
witness' testimony because of poor recollection or perception, I may credit that
witness' testimony in other important respects. Very often I conclude that the
facts lie somewhere between the individual recollections of each of the wit-
nesses. Corroboration, particularly by document, by an opposing witness, or by
disinterested witnesses, gets substantial weight. I put demeanor low on my list.
In most cases I don't find it helpful. So much of what we observe is ambiguous
in significance .... [B]ehaviors which can indicate lying can also indicate pow-
erlessness, nervousness, etc. But... [cihanges in demeanor, while the witness is
on the stand, mean more to me than consistent behavior. If a confident witness
loses his poise when confronted with what appears to be a document he had for-
gotten about and cannot explain, that change in demeanor will impress me. But
even then, the change in demeanor rarely stands alone. It is usually accompa-
nied by evasiveness, defensiveness, excessive rationalization, all of which appear
on the face of the record and give an independent basis for resolving credibility.
... Finally, while I do it at times, I am leery about basing credibility resolutions
on the plausibility or implausibility of a witness .... That something is implau-
sible means that it may happen only one out of one hundred times, but your case
may be that one time.
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pearance and conduct. This evidence tends to probe the credibility of
testimony by indicating the witness's sincerity based on the witness's
manner and conduct.
The use of demeanor to make credibility determinations assumes that
a witness appears in person before the fact-finder. In our system of adju-
dication, trials are usually held in open court unless a supervening policy
(e.g., protecting witness privacy or trade secrets) intervenes. The em-
phasis on testimony in open court was incorporated into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "to combat the practice in equity of presenting
juries with edited depositions of witnesses' testimony. 4 6 In addition to
the concerns pertaining to the accuracy and completeness of testimony,
which might be compromised by edited depositions, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure's strong preference for the testimony of live witnesses
allows the fact-finder to observe the demeanor of the witness. 47 Im-
provements in technology, however, show the need for flexibility in re-
quiring testimony to be presented in open court.
An exception to the modern trend of live testimony, for example, is
the use of video technology4 to present testimony to the trier of fact.49
46. Murphy v. Tivoli Enterprises, 953 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussing the
Advisory Committee's reasoning in drafting Rule 43(a)). Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure states, in part, that "[i]n every trial the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken in open court, unless a federal law, these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise." FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
47. See Adair v. Sunwest Bank, 965 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulating the
primary purposes of Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
48. There are generally four types of video testimony used in litigation: video deposi-
tions, demonstrative evidence on videotape, video transcripts, and video hearings. See
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Changing Litigation With Science and Technology: Video Deposi-
tions, Transcripts and Trials, 43 EMORY L.J. 1071, 1071 (1994). With video testimony, a
judge may edit the video, deleting inadmissible evidence and arguments, and thereby
shorten and rationalize the trial. See James L. McCrystal & Ann B. Maschari, Prere-
corded Trials, 9 LITIG. 32, 32-33 (1983). A courtroom in the Sarasota, Florida County
Judicial Center has five cameras and seven supersensitive microphones that enable jurors
"to use the video to review a defendant's behavior on the witness stand." Tom Spalding,
Cameras Provide Courtroom Video, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Jan. 3, 2000, at 1.
49. Another, more dubious exception to the modern trend of live testimony involves
the federal district courts' delegation of a pre-trial motion to a magistrate and, on review
under the Magistrates Act, adoption of a magistrate's credibility findings. The district
court's reversal of those findings that are based upon the magistrate's observation of the
witness's demeanor "could well give rise to serious questions" of due process. United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 n.7 (1980). The dissent believed demeanor was so
important that a district court must rehear testimony when credibility is at issue, even
when upholding the magistrate's finding. See id. at 687-91 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The
majority expressed serious reservations about allowing a judge to make findings contrary
to the credibility determinations of the magistrate. See id. at 680-81 & n.7 (stating in dicta
that the majority "assume[s] it is unlikely that a district judge would reject a magistrate's
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Video technology allows a witness to testify without being physically
present in court, while still giving the fact-finder the advantage of ob-
serving the witness's demeanor. ° Despite the preference for live testi-
mony over deposition testimony, that preference is substantially under-
cut when a videotape provides the trier of fact with the opportunity to
observe the deponent answering questions.5'
Another exception to live testimony is the use of tape-recorded tele-
phone depositions. The use of such evidence affords a higher level of
due process in determining witness credibility than written deposition
transcripts because the court hears the witness's voice, one of the indicia
of demeanor credibility.5 2 Seeking to lower costs and expedite determi-
nations, some administrative agencies have adopted telephone hearings
to decide on the merits, among other matters, disability, welfare, and un-
employment compensation. 3 Due process, however, may require in-
proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive and substitute the
judge's own appraisal").
50. See Neil Fox, Note, Telephonic Hearings in Welfare Appeals: How Much Process
is Due?, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 456 ("Researchers have concluded that juries respond
no differently to videotaped testimony than to live testimony."). Rule 43(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure was amended on December 1, 1996, to provide: "The court
may, for good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards,
permit presentation of testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a
different location." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). If a witness is unable to travel to trial because
of illness, but can testify from a remote location, contemporaneous transmission is prefer-
able to difficulties involved with rescheduling the trial. See id. advisory committee's note.
The Advisory Committee makes clear the importance of presenting live testimony in
court whenever possible: "The very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder
may exert a powerful force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of the
witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition." Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 88 F.R.D. 296, 299 (E.D. Mich. 1980). A few jurisdic-
tions have adopted videotaped testimony as standard procedure. In these jurisdictions,
entire trials may be prerecorded and presented to juries at a later date. See Fox, supra
note 50, at 456 n.58 (discussing Ohio's use of videotaped trials); Videotaped Murder Trial
in Ohio, 68 A.B.A. J. 533, 533 (1982) (mentioning that the first videotaped murder trial in
the nation's history was believed to take place in Ohio in the early 1980s).
52. Such electronic evidence is generally admissible, assuming the live testimony of
the witness would be admissible. See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Churchfield Publica-
tions, Inc, 756 F. Supp. 1393, 1398-99 n.2 (D. Or. 1990), affd sub nom. Official Airline
Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1993) (overruling objections to the use of tele-
phone testimony by witnesses and reasoning that because the testimony was made in open
court and under oath, it satisfies Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see
also Rothermel v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., No. 95-2253, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3815, at
*16-*17 (8th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996) (per curiam) (holding that it was not error to play the tape
of a telephone deposition at trial); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129
F.R.D. 424, 426 (D.P.R. 1989) (permitting counsel to examine witnesses, beyond the sub-
poena power, by live television satellite hookup).
53. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.141(b)(2)(i), 1.144(c)(11) (1999) (authorizing, in the United
States Department of Agriculture Rules of Practice, hearings by telephone or audio/visual
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person hearings-4 when credibility is a major issue in the case, even in
administrative proceedings.5
A. The History of Live Testimony
Live testimony and the demeanor evidence stemming from it have a
long history in the development of trial practice. In NLRB v. Dinion
Coil Co. ,6 Judge Frank discussed the early Roman legal practice of wit-
nesses testifying orally before the judge. In the fourteenth century,
"Postglossators," sitting as judges, maintained that the "indispensable
requisite for the judge to form his opinion on the trustworthiness of wit-
nesses was that they appeared before him personally. 5 7 The oral testi-
mony was not recorded, but the judge put on the record the "personal
electronic means); see also generally Allan A. Toubman et al., Due Process Implications
of Telephone Hearings: The Case for an Individualized Approach to Scheduling Telephone
Hearings, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 407 (1996) (discussing the challenges of conducting a
hearing by telephone lines).
54. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-47 (1976) (holding that a recipient of
social security disability benefits was not entitled to a pretermination hearing, and noting
that where "issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decision-
making process ... 'written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision"');
see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1979) (stating that when the Social
Security Administration must balance a claimant's intelligence, physical and mental con-
dition, and good faith, the Court could "not see how these can be evaluated absent per-
sonal contact between the recipient and the person who decides his case"); Martin v. Hel-
stad, 699 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[D]eprivations of a property interest without
opportunity for an oral personal exchange are generally disfavored... [a]nd where credi-
bility is in issue, an oral hearing is required."); S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 85,
88 (7th Cir. 1946) (finding that due process requires a demeanor observation). In cases
involving school or prison discipline, or juvenile commitment to a mental hospital, trun-
cated procedures satisfy the due process requirement of a hearing. See Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
55. Credibility and demeanor determinations are central to most disability determi-
nations. See Fox, supra note 50, at 469-70 (discussing the role of credibility evidence in a
fact-finder's determination of disability). In welfare cases and some other administrative
cases credibility is not as important and federal court decisions have been mixed. Com-
pare Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ordering the district
court to examine the class of medicare claims under $100 to determine if credibility was
involved and suggesting that in the minority of cases where credibility was determinative,
telephone hearings may violate due process rights), with Casey v. O'Bannon, 536 F. Supp.
350, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that a hearing officer's visual analysis is not a consti-
tutional requirement and reasoning that the hearing officer "can effectively judge credi-
bility over the phone by noting voice responses, pauses, [and] levels of irritation"); see
also Bigby v. INS, 21 F.3d 1059, 1064 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that "when credibility de-
terminations are not in issue, an [administrative law] judge may hold a hearing by tele-
phonic means").
56. 201 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1952).
57. Id. at 488.
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impressions made upon the judge by the witnesses, their way of answer-
ing questions, their reactions and behavior in Court... [such as,] that the
witness stammered, hesitated in replying to a specific question, or
showed fear during the interrogation." '58
It is believed that the first English criminal jury trial took place in 1220
at Westminster.59 Prior to 1215, criminal trials were by ordeal, but in that
year, Pope Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council forbade priests
to officiate at ordeals and the criminal justice system moved to jury tri-
als.6 King Henry III ordered the substitution of judgment by neighbors
for the ordeal in 1219, and by the end of the thirteenth century the older
methods of trial were largely superseded. 6' The English criminal courts
were reluctant to decide upon sworn testimony, at first allowing only the
prosecutor to call sworn witnesses. Until about 1550, the defendant
could only speak unsworn; he could not call witnesses. It was not until
approximately 1700 that the defendant could call sworn witnesses, and
not until the mid-nineteenth century that the defendant could give sworn
testimony.62
The Anglo-American legal system, evolving out of the common law,
generally requires live testimony by the witness to allow the fact-finder
to observe the demeanor and to assess the witness's credibility. In Eng-
land, although the chancery courts rarely conducted in-court witness ex-
61
aminations, the common law courts used open, in-court testimony.
58. Id.
59. See Fisher, supra note 40, at 585 (noting that prior to 1220 juries sat in civil dis-
putes, but had yet to be employed in criminal cases).
60. See id. at 585-86 (discussing the pre-1215 practice of trial by ordeal); Stephan
Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 26 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (describing the decisions of
the Church in 1215). The end of trial by ordeal was imminent:
English and other European justice systems soon abandoned the ordeal in crimi-
nal cases. Though the Church took no action against trial by battle, that form of
trial lacked the popular support needed to fill the role of the lost ordeals; too of-
ten, combat between accuser and accused ended badly for a worthy but weak
litigant. Moreover, it was not always obvious who should do battle for the
prosecution. Criminal justice systems throughout Europe, therefore, suddenly
sought a new form of trial.
Fisher, supra note 40, at 586 (footnotes omitted).
61. See generally Fisher, supra note 40, at 585-87.
62. See id. at 579-80 (exploring the history of the criminal trial jury).
63. See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 n.2 (2d Cir. 1949) (discussing the different
practices of oral trial testimony in the early Anglo-American equity courts and common-
law courts). Early Roman law used oral testimony before a private individual who had the
duty of settling disputes of fact. See Fox, supra note 50, at 450. Most continental canon
and lay courts chose not to use open, in-court testimony, and instead relied upon written
testimony given by a witness out the trier of fact's sight. See id. The common law's pref-
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Proponents of open, in-court testimony argued that it was more proba-
tive of finding the truth than the secret examination taken in writing."
The backers correctly noted that with in-court testimony, "the persons
who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing
the ... witness."" In 1875, the chancery court ended this divergence in
principle from its common law brethren by adopting open, in-court tes-
timony.66
Early American jurisprudence followed the English chancery, as prior
to 1912 witness testimony came in the form of written deposition in eq-
uity litigation.6 ' The Equity Rules of 1912 changed this position by
shifting to the common law practice method of oral testimony. Rule 43
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now articulates the general rule
that "[iun every trial the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open
court. ,68
A live witness, facing a possible attack on his credibility, serves two
significant purposes. First, the trier of fact can observe the witness's de-
meanor, and second, he can inspire the witness to testify truthfully to
"'ensur[e] the integrity of the factfinding process."' 69  Live testimony
should be replaced only with great care.
B. Importance of Demeanor Evidence
The scope of conduct that encompasses demeanor is quite broad. A
witness's demeanor includes:
[T]he tone of voice in which a witness's statement is made, the
hesitation or readiness with which his answers are given, the
look of the witness, his carriage, his evidence of surprise, his
gestures, his zeal, his bearing, his expression, his yawns, the use
of his eyes, his furtive or meaning glances, or his shrugs, the
pitch of his voice, his self-possession or embarrassment, his air
erence for in-court testimony ruled the day as it was not until 1831 that Parliament
changed the law to permit unavailable witnesses to give their testimony by written deposi-
tion. See id. at 451.
64. See Fox, supra note 50, at 451.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that "[in
federal courts, except for a short period from 1789 to 1802, oral testimony in open court
was not required in equity litigation; indeed, for many years it was virtually banned").
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a); see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the purposes behind Rule 43(a)).
69. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
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of candor or seeming levity.0
It is possible that the witness's demeanor is the determinative factor in
appraising trustworthiness and, therefore, can never be ignored.71 Wit-
nesses' demeanor has long been regarded as a primary "method of ascer-
taining the truth and accuracy of their narratives.
7 2
There is judicial precedent holding that the importance of demeanor
evidence alone could be enough to decide a particular issue, or even a
case. 73 Judge Learned Hand articulated the importance of demeanor
evidence:
The words used are by no means all that we rely on in making
up our minds about the truth of a question.., a jury... may,
and indeed they should, take into consideration the whole
nexus of sense impressions which they get from a witness....
[S]uch evidence may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the wit-
ness's testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of
his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive to deny, may
be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defi-
ance, as to give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he
is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he de-
nies.74
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (6th ed. 1990). The witness's "manner, his into-
nations, his grimaces, [and] his gestures" are often critical indicators of truthfulness.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949)
(articulating that while demeanor is no fool-proof means to determine the truthfulness of
testimony, "it is one of the best guides available"); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:
MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 21 (2d ed. 1950) (discussing the use of de-
meanor to determine the reliability of the testimony).
71. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967)
(discussing the importance of demeanor in assessing the witness's credibility).
72. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1946) (opining on the importance
of live testimony as an avenue for the fact-finder to observe the witness's demeanor to
judge credibility). In Arnstein, the plaintiff, a composer, sued Cole Porter for copyright
infringement by several musical compositions and the trial court issued summary judg-
ment on depositions. Id. at 469. The circuit court reversed and remanded, reasoning that
the plaintiff's credibility was an issue and, therefore, a matter for the jury. See id. The
court correctly observed that the jury, despite the plaintiff's "fantastic" story, must have
an opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor to ascertain truthfulness. Id.
73. See Broadcast Music, 175 F.2d at 80; Stanley v. Review Bd. of the Dep't of Empl.
and Training Servs., 528 N.E.2d 811, 813, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ("[I]t is vital to our
holding that we find the sole determinative factor in the present cause to be that of de-
meanor credibility."). In Broadcast Music, the court "held that, solely on the basis of a
trial judge's disbelief in the oral testimony of a plaintiff's witness-a disbelief resulting
entirely from the witness's demeanor-the judge may decide for the defendant." Dyer v.
MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 270 n.3 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring) (discussing the
holding in Broadcast Music).
74. Dyer, 201 F.2d at 269. This case is frequently cited for this quote by Judge Hand,
which is dicta, and for Judge Frank's concurring opinion:
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There is, however, substantial opposition to Judge Hand's view.75 Some
argue that determining the credibility of a witness's testimony solely on
the basis of demeanor evidence is, at best, unreliable."6
Demeanor will never be an infallible method of determining the ve-
racity of a witness. It is inevitable that at times liars will convince juries
and judges of their truthfulness, while honest witnesses nervously fail to
convince."7 Irrespective of its potential pitfalls when analyzed with other
factors, such as consistency and corroboration, demeanor evidence is still
one of the best guides to judging a witness's credibility.7 Demeanor evi-
dence requires fact-finders to use their "natural and acquired shrewd-
ness" and experience to assess demeanor and credibility. 9
I agree with Judge Hand that (at least in some cases) a trial judge should be al-
lowed to find that a plaintiff has discharged his burden of proof when the judge
disbelieves oral testimony all of which is adverse to plaintiff, solely because of
the trial court's reaction to the witnesses' demeanor and there is no evidence for
plaintiff except that "demeanor evidence."
Id. at 270 (Frank, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
75. See Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1100.
Two related doctrinal controversies concern credibility of testimony: first,
whether the trier may reject the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of a
disinterested witness, and second, whether the trier may find a fact on the basis
of disbelief of testimony denying the fact. The prevalent law on these issues re-
flects a degree of judicial skepticism concerning the power of demeanor to re-
veal truth and falsehood to jurors. All courts have refused to permit findings
based solely on disbelief of testimony to the contrary .... A few courts have
permitted juries to disbelieve uncontradicted, unimpeached, disinterested testi-
mony, but the great majority do not.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. See Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Penasquitos Village, Judge
Duniway pointed out those situations in which the consideration of demeanor evidence by
the trier of fact results in an incorrect conclusion of the witness's truthfulness. Id. (Duni-
way, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Duniway does acknowledge,
however, that analyzing the witness's demeanor is an indispensable factor in determining
credibility. See id. (Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ("The law
would not permit me to so hold if I wished to, and I do not wish it to.").
77. See id. at 1084-85. (Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
accomplished liar cited by Judge Duniway in Penasquitos Villiage could mask the clues of
deception, just as with the polygraph test, by becoming convinced of his story, thereby
seemingly testifying with sincerity. Id. (Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE,
POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE 51 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter EKMAN, TELLING LIES] (ac-
knowledging that the polygraph test "does not detect lies, just signs of emotion").
78. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1952) (suggesting that
despite the immense discretion conferred on the trial judge or hearing examiner to make
demeanor-based credibility determinations, "few would doubt that the risk involved is, on
the whole, well worthwhile"); supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 489.
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C. Ineffable Demeanor
Demeanor evidence is one of those "elusive and incommunicable" im-
ponderables 8° that is hard to isolate and to quantify scientifically, but
nonetheless forms a foundation for our legal system. As stated above, to
determine the witness's credibility, the fact-finder must observe the wit-
ness's posture, whether the witness acts nervous, avoids eye contact,
demonstrates pain, sheds tears, fluctuates the tone of his speech, as well
as an assortment of other nonverbal communications."'
Despite the long history of demeanor evidence and the requirement
that the fact-finder specify exact factors of demeanor relied upon in
reaching a determination of witness credibility,8' traditionally the com-
mon law accepted generally the fact-finder's determinations of witness
credibility based on demeanor.s3 Judge Frank, a supporter of the use of
demeanor to determine credibility, assumed that unless the fact-finder
described irrationally the witness's conduct, the fact-finder's assessment
of demeanor credibility was unassailable on appeal.?4 In addition, Judge
Hand believed that a true assessment of the witness's demeanor should
not be limited to words and phrases but should include "consideration
[of] the whole nexus of sense impressions, 85 from the witness's observa-
tions.s6 Judge Frank and the prevailing tradition of the common law
seem to hold that the credibility conclusion based on witness demeanor
80. Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence; Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47
A.B.A. J. 580, 580 (1961) (noting that the fact-finder faces a difficult task in correctly as-
sessing a witness's credibility on the basis of demeanor evidence due to the relatively
short time to observe the witness on the stand). Often, the trial judge does more harm
than good in instructing the jury on demeanor evidence. For instance, in Quercia v.
United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933), the Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction be-
cause the judge, in instructing the jury, stated that the defendant "wiped" his hands dur-
ing testimony and "that is almost always an indication of lying." Quercia, 289 U.S. at 468.
81. See Penasquitos Village, 565 F.2d at 1078-79; see also 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1395 (James H. Chadbourne ed., 1974) (citing
authorities).
82. See supra Part I.A-B. (discussing the history of live testimony and the role of
demeanor evidence).
83. See Penasquitos Village, 565 F.2d at 1078-79 (reasoning that the fact-finder has
the opportunity to observe the live witness).
84. See Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 488-89; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid
Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge Frank felt, however, that "meth-
ods of evaluating the credibility of oral testimony do not lend themselves to formulations
in terms of rules and are thus, inescapably, 'un-ruly."' Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 488-89.
85. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952).
86. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("[O]nly the
trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so
heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said."); cf. Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-97 (1951).
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
is ineffable, leaving to the triers of fact the responsibility for determining
demeanor credibility based upon their "own nature and acquired sagac-
ity."
87
D. Deference Accorded Findings Based on Credibility of Witness
Federal courts apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to testi-
monial evidence where the trial court observes and evaluates the wit-
ness's credibility firsthand.8 In articulating the standard of review, the
Supreme Court stated that:
[W]hen a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit
the testimony of one or two or more witnesses, each of whom
has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not con-
tradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally in-
consistent, can virtually never be clear error.89
Consequently, the trier of fact may disregard the witness's testimony
as untruthful, and those findings must be given great deference. The ap-
pellate court applies the clear error rule improperly when it weighs evi-
dence de novo where the trial court's finding is based on demeanor and
credibility. 90
A trial judge's credibility determinations, based on an evaluation of
credibility of conflicting witnesses, can virtually never be clear error.
Clear error is usually found only where the "judge believes physically
impossible things, or disbelieves testimony supported by unrefuted
documents." 9' It must be noted, however, that the trial judge cannot in-
sulate his findings from review by labeling the findings "credibility de-
87. Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 489. Conclusory opinions of lay persons are regularly
admitted as evidence. See Cardwell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 504 F.2d 444, 447-48 (6th
Cir. 1974) (admitting a Wife's testimony that her husband suffered "anxiety, depression
[and] resentment"); United States v. Gallagher, 437 F.2d 1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 1971)
(holding that a lay person may testify as to whether another person was intoxicated); Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry. v. Green, 164 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1947) ("It is competent for any wit-
ness to testify from observation that a person appeared to be in pain.").
88. See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir.
1996); Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 30 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussing the standard of review of the fact-finder's credibility determination); Metzen v.
United States, 19 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[O]nly the trial judge can be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's under-
standing of and belief in what is said.").
89. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575.
90. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1878) ("The manner of the
[witness) while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion
than his words... [care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse
the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case.").
91. Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1996).
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terminations." 92 The witness's demeanor is just one factor used to decide
a witness's credibility. It may turn out that documents or some other
form of objective evidence contradict the witness's story. In addition,
the witness's story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible
on its face as to render the reasonable fact-finder to dismiss it as untruth-
ful. Where factors other than demeanor are present, the reviewing court
may find clear error, even if the finding was purportedly based on a
credibility determination.3
E. Demeanor Findings in Administrative Agencies
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs),9 4 like other trial judges in bench
trials, find facts and decide witnesses' credibility.95 The ALJ either rec-
ommends or makes an initial decision; however, at most agencies re-
viewing on appeal, the agency "has all the powers which it would have in
making the initial decision. ' 96 In fact, the agency can determine facts
even where those findings are based on the witness's demeanor. An ad-
ministrative agency may not, however, ignore findings by the ALJ based
92. In addition, of course, these findings should not be irrational. For instance, in
People v. Patubo, 71 P.2d 270 (Cal. 1937), the California Supreme Court reversed a mur-
der conviction when the trial judge told the jury that the testifying defendant had the
"hangdog look of a guilty man." Patubo, 71 P.2d at 272; see also, e.g., Hadley Mfg. Corp.,
108 N.L.R.B. 1641, 1644 & n.3 (1954) (rejecting the trial examiner's credibility finding
involving a "youthful, buxom and attractive" witness).
93. See Hadley, 108 N.L.R.B. at 1643-44.
94. The title of Administrative Law Judge was conferred upon triers of fact of ad-
ministrative proceedings in 1972. The position was formerly known as "hearing exam-
iner" or "trial examiner." A United States Civil Service Commission regulation changed
the title to Administrative Law Judge on August 19, 1972. See Programs for Specific Posi-
tions and Examinations, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). The title was statutorily enacted on
March 27,1978. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
95. For a discussion on the judicial status of the federal ALJ, see James P. Timony,
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 807, 810-15 (1983). In addition to federal ALJs, as of 1992, 438 officers with law
degrees known as "administrative judges" preside at 11 federal agencies, including
Boards of Contract Appeals, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Merit System Protection Board and Department of Veterans
Affairs. See John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Gov-
ernment, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 274, 349 (1992). There are more than 2000 other pre-
siding officers, almost all of whom are not lawyers and have duties in addition to their
adjudicatory responsibilities. See id. at 350. Although the "administrative judges" are not
selected under the rigorous selection process used for ALJs and do not have the ALJs'
statutory protections against interference with their independent and impartial decision-
making, they generally perform the same judicial tasks. See James P. Timony, Perform-
ance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 629, 633-36
(1993).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1994).
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on credibility.
Deference is given to the AL's observation of the witness's de-
meanor97 and, although generally the agency has fact-finding power on
review of the judge's decision, the judge's findings of fact must at least be
considered.98 At some federal agencies, the judge's findings are final and
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, 99 unless clearly errone-
ous.'0° Thus, even if the agency reviews and reconsiders a judge's conclu-
sions of law, the factual basis for such analysis may be conclusively de-
termined by the ALJ.
F. Standard for Review by Courts of Administrative Law Judge's
Credibility Findings
In federal appeals of an administrative agency opinion, the AUL's
credibility determinations, adopted by the agency, are reviewed under a
variety of standards. Appellate courts have used a test of "heightened
scrutiny"' O' and have upheld the agency's (and, thus the AL's) findings
unless they are "patently without basis in the record."' 2 Courts reverse
97. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951); Eastern Eng'g
& Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980).
98. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c).
99. See Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86, 90-92 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
that "the only 'question' relating to the factual findings of an AU that the Commission
can consider is whether those finding are supported by substantial evidence").
100. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.44 (1999) (discussing the standard of review for a reviewing
International Trade Commission (citing to 19 C.F.R. § 210.43(b)(1)(i))). Findings of fact
in the federal district courts are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). The substantial evidence rule places a higher limitation on judicial re-
view of findings of administrative agencies. See United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1948). Therefore, an AL's findings, which are subject to the
substantial evidence rule, if not reversed by the agency, may carry more weight than those
of federal district court judges. See id.
101. In Aylett v. HUD, 54 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995), the court held that the Housing
and Urban Development Secretary's rejection of the credibility findings of the AU who
dismissed all charges that respondents had discriminated against a woman who wanted to
rent their apartment did not pass the "heightened scrutiny" test. Aylett, 54 F.3d at 1560,
1562. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that:
[W]here the Secretary, acting through the Appeals Council, overturns a decision
of the AL granting benefits, and, in so doing, differs with the AL's assessment
of witness credibility, the Secretary should fully articulate his reasons for so do-
ing, and then, with heightened scrutiny, we must decide whether such reasons
find support in the record.
Id. at 1566 (noting that the basis for heightened scrutiny is the AL's opportunity to hear
and observe the witness's live testimony, which places the AL in the best position to as-
sess the witness's demeanor and its impact on the credibility determination).
102. Southwest Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(citing Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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an Administrative Law Judge's credibility determinations only in "rare
circumstances,"'0'3 where the ALJ "overstepped the bounds of reason, ' '
and those findings are "hopelessly incredible,"1 5 "inherently incredible,"
"patently unreasonable,"'0° or "patently wrong."'07 The ALJ's findings of
credibility are reviewed with great deference,'° as it is not the appellate
courts' "function to review [an] ALJ's credibility determinations."'09
G. Specificity of Demeanor Findings
In federal administrative adjudication under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, it is usually the administrative agency, and not the ALJ"0 or
other presiding official, that has the ultimate fact finding responsibility."'
The agency, therefore, may be reluctant to present this power to the trial
103. NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Servs., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1993).
104. NLRB v. Horizons Hotel Corp., 49 F.3d 795, 799 (1st Cir. 1995) (affording great
weight to the AL's credibility determinations because of his opportunity to observe the
witness's testimony and holding that the ALJ's credibility determinations may not be dis-
carded unless it is evident the ALl jumped the fence of reason).
105. Pergament United Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1990) (dis-
cussing the weight of an agency's acceptance of an AL's credibility finding).
106. Bobo v. United States Dep't of Agric., 52 F.3d 1406, 1416 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the Court of Appeals "generally will not disturb and gives deference to the credibility
assessments of an AL who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the wit-
nesses"); Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).
107. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1990) ("An ALJ's credibility deter-
minations will be affirmed on appeal unless the appellant can demonstrate that they are
'patently wrong."').
108. See Indosuez Carr Futures, Inc. v. CFTC, 27 F.3d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting the heightened deference afforded to the ALl's credibility determinations com-
pared to the already "substantial deference" given to an AU's general fact findings);
Henry v. Department of Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that an ALl's
credibility findings are "virtually unreviewable"); see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(c) (1996)
(discussing the limited circumstances where a court of appeals may set aside agency de-
terminations upon review).
109. Owens v. NTSB, 734 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1984).
110. Federal AL~s are "functionally comparable" to trial judges within the judicial
branch. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). The Administrative Procedure Act
guarantees ALJs independence. See id. at 514; see also generally, Frye, supra note 95, at
263-65; Timony, supra note 95,.at 631-33, 635 n.29.
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1994); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 495 (1951) (articulating the Supreme Court's belief that although the administrative
agency had all the powers that it would have in making the initial decision, its decision
should "be influenced by the [ALl's] opportunity to observe the witnesses he hears and
sees and the Board does not"). Statutes give significance to the examiners' findings that
could be of consequence, for example, to the extent that material facts in any case depend
upon the determination, of the witnesses' credibility, by an "impartial, experienced ex-
aminer who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case," as shown by the wit-
nesses' demeanor or conduct at the hearing. Id. at 496.
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judge and may require trial judges who make demeanor findings to
specify the impressions derived from observing the witnesses testify."' In
reversing a trial judge's demeanor credibility findings, the agency may
revert to England's nineteenth century equity court practice that did not
follow the common law cases recorded by Blackstone, which held that
persons who decide evidence should have the opportunity to observe the
witness. 3 By denying the person presiding at trial the right to have
credibility findings, the agency may, in turn, deny due process to the liti-
gating parties."'
Literal compliance with the specification of impressions received from
the observation of a witness's testimony is a complex task."' There are
•• 116
many indicia of a speaker's emotions. To provide a record that may
rationally be reviewed on appeal, a more general description of the ob-
served behavior by the fact-finder would assist the reviewing authority."7
112. In 1960, the NLRB required hearing examiners to:
[S]pell out in detail, the indicia upon which they believe one witness as against
another. In both those cases the Board reversed the examiners' credibility
resolutions because they did not rest their evaluation of the witnesses' credibility
on "demeanor." Both examiners merely prefaced their conclusions by stating
that they based their credibility findings on their "observation of the witnesses."
Evidently, this is not sufficient. It would appear that in evaluating a witness' tes-
timony in terms of demeanor evidence, the Board will require examiners to de-
lineate specifically the impressions derived from observing the witness testify.
Sahm, supra note 80, at 582; see also Special Counsel v. Eubanks, 76 M.S.P.B. 405, 416
(1997) (discussing the identical requirement of the Merit Systems Protection Board).
113. These cases held that a witness's "demeanor" includes the witness's "quality, age,
education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 373 (2d ed. 1876). Psychological research shows that the jurors of the
late twentieth century instinctively based a portion of their credibility decisions on the
witness's "social status, style of speech, clothing, or occupation." J. Alexander Tanford &
Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collabo-
ration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 749 (1988).
114. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 684-85 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (stating that a district judge's reversal of a magistrate's credibility determinations
would upset accurate decisionmaking); see also generally Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 696-97 (1979) (supporting the argument that due process requires that witness credi-
bility findings must be made by the person presiding at the trial).
115. The Merit System Protection Board requires the trial judge to "summarize all the
evidence on each disputed question of fact sufficient to disclose the evidentiary basis for
the presiding official's finding of fact." Eubanks, 76 M.S.P.B. at 413.
116. One expert, Dr. Paul Ekman, has identified 60 body movements and 46 facial
muscle movements as emblems of the speaker's emotions. See EKMAN, TELLING LIES,
supra note 77, at 98.
117. See MORELL E. MULLINS, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 111-12
(3d ed. 1993). Professor Mullins suggested the following standard:
Where credibility is in issue the reviewing authority may look to the judge's de-
meanor findings on the theory that the judge observed the witness and therefore
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H. "Sit and Squirm" Demeanor
The reviewing court may find that the ALU's use of demeanor evi-
dence to determine witness credibility is not warranted. For instance, at
Social Security Administration disability hearings where the claimant
alleges disabling pain, the ALJ may determine that the claimant's de-
meanor demonstrates evidence on that issue. The ALJ's demeanor ob-
servations at the hearing cannot cause him to ignore subjective testimony
of the claimant's pain. The ALU may not reject a claimant's assertion of
pain where uncontroverted evidence corroborates the claim as genu-
ine.1
18
In Wilson v. Heckler,"9 the ALJ observed the claimant at the hearing
and saw no physical signs of severe pain. Although the claimant used a
cane and stood at times during the hearing, the ALJ determined that the
witness answered the questions alertly, that his thoughts did not wander,
and that he manifested no clinical symptoms of constant and severe pain.
The court reversed the AL's denial of disability benefits on this basis
and condemned the procedure as "sit and squirm jurisprudence."'1 2
was in the best position to evaluate the witness' credibility. Consequently, the
judge should exercise extreme care in such findings, and avoid conclusory state-
ments such as "from the witness' demeanor it is concluded that the testimony
cannot be believed." Instead, credibility findings should be supported by spe-
cific conduct or observations. For instance, a witness may be talkative and com-
fortable in response to all questions, except those addressing the issue on which
credibility is doubtful, but whenever the questioning turns to that issue, the wit-
ness becomes evasive and starts looking away from the judge and toward coun-
sel, as if for signals. • At any rate, to the extent possible, findings grounded on
witness demeanor should have some reference point in observed behavior, such
as evasiveness, hesitancy, or discomfort under questioning.
Id.
118. See Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1985); Benson v. Schweiker,
652 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1981); Hon. Thomas P. Smith & Patrick M. Fahey, Some Points
on Litigating Title II and Title XVI Social Security Disability Claims in United States Dis-
trict Court, 14 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 243, 268 (1994).
119. 734 F.2d 513 (11th Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 517; see also Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1987); Rein-
hart v. HHS, 733 F.2d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1984); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 113 (2d
Cir. 1981). One court found that the absence of pain during the disability hearing is not
the issue. See Lovelace, 813 F.2d at 59-60 (reversing the AL's denial of disability bene-
fits on the grounds that obesity, like alcoholism, can be disabling, albeit remediable, and
that demeanor alone was not sufficient to overcome subjective evidence of pain). The
court in Lovelace stated that:
Even if a person's demeanor can be taken to reflect his degree of pain when that
pain is chronic, the issue is not how much pain Lovelace suffers when he is at
rest. The relevant question is how much pain he experiences when trying to
work. Lovelace's demeanor at the hearing sheds little, if any, light on that ques-
tion.
Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). However, if the claimant's pain must be measured only in
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Courts deprecating the "sit and squirm" method of detecting pain ar-
gue that an ALJ, who is not a medical expert, is subjectively using an in-
dex of traits. The fear is that in using this approach the ALJ formulates
unreliable conclusions. 121 In addition, using this index may discourage
claimants from facing an ALJ "for fear that they may not appear to the
unexpert eye to be as bad as they feel.'
122
Even in circuit courts denouncing "sit and squirm" findings, however,
the AL's evaluation of the witness's credibility is entitled to judicial
deference, and if demeanor is one of several factors analyzed in coming
to a credibility finding, the finding will be upheld.2 3 Distinctions made
by the ALJ between the evidentiary value of "sit and squirm" demeanor
evidence and such evidence in other courts should not overcome the
need for such decisions to be made by the fact-finder who presides at the
taking of the testimony.
I. Terms of Credibility and Demeanor
Fact-finders often specify the details of their impressions derived from
observing the witness testify, thereby following Professor Morell Mul-
lins's suggestion that findings based on the witness's demeanor have
some reference point in observed behavior, such as evasiveness, hesi-
tancy, or discomfort while testifying."4 Foregoing the entertaining but
ambiguous descriptions such as twitching, stuttering, sweating, or blink-
ing, the fact-finder may use instead terms and phrases such as "recalci-
trance and obvious reluctance" to answer questions, "sudden lapse[s] of
memory," "seemingly defiant demeanor," or "hesitant and noncommit-
tal.' ' 125 In the alternative, the trier of fact may uphold the witness's ve-
the workplace, medical reports of physicians' examinations in their offices, rather than at
the claimant's workplace, would seem to suffer the same deficiency.
121. See Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776, 789 (E.D. Va. 1976) (holding that the
"sit and squirm" standard upon which the ALJ based his credibility determination was
legally impermissible).
122. Id. at 798.
123. Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ALJ's
credibility finding, which was based on the claimant's demeanor and medical evidence,
was proper); Shrewsbury v. Chater, No. 94-2235, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27968, at *10 n.7
(4th Cir. Oct. 6, 1995) (per curiam) ("[I]t is not reversible error for an ALJ to consider a
claimant's demeanor when he has already determined that the claimant's alleged level of
pain is inconsistent with the objective medical evidence."); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d
1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining that demeanor was just one factor in the ALl's
credibility finding).
124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., Getahun v. INS, No. 98-2223, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10860, at *3-*4 (4th
Cir. May 26, 1999) (per curiam) (discussing the ALl's finding of a lack of credibility based
on an observation of the witness's "seemingly defiant demeanor," in which the AUJ de-
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racity with positive demeanor findings such as honesty and forthright-
ness, frankness and sincerity, or straightforwardness.
12
In determining a witness's credibility, trial judges sometimes cite de-
meanor as the lone factor 7 or cite both demeanor and some other credi-
bility factor, such as plausibility, character, inconsistencies, incomplete
and unsound explanation, or collaborating evidence.' Credibility find-
termined that the witness was not "forthright, her testimony was constricted and limited
to the bare minimum in her responses, and her testimony was vague and evasive"); Un-
derwriters Labs. Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the AL
found that, based on their demeanor and the shifting nature of their testimony, two wit-
nesses were not "particularly reliable" because they were "hesitant and noncommittal");
Esquivel-Acevedo v. INS, No. 95-70093, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8569, at *5-*6 (9th Cir.
Apr. 1, 1996) (mem.) (upholding the AL's finding that the witness's "demeanor did not
correspond with that of a credible witness because he failed to respond directly to prof-
fered questions"); In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding a con-
tempt ruling based on a witness's demeanor, his "inherently incredible" answers, his "re-
calcitrance and obvious reluctance to answer" questions implicating others, and his
sudden loss of memory and inability to recognize even himself in photographs).
126. See, e.g., Underwriters Labs., 147 F.3d at 1048, 1053 (discussing the AL's finding
of credibility due to the witness's forthrightness); Aylett v. HUD, 54 F.3d 1560, 1568 (10th
Cir. 1995) (upholding the AL's findings that a particular witness was credible because of
the AL's observation of the witness's demeanor, which led the ALl to conclude that the
witness was "very frank and sincere [and] ... very convincing"); Shelton v. Babbitt, 921 F.
Supp. 787, 790 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (articulating the court's finding that the witness was "a
calm individual with an appropriate witness demeanor, whose testimony was credible");
United States v. $19,047.00 in United States Currency, No. 92 Civ 8052, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17126, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1994), aftfd, 95 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
the witness credible in light of the fact that "[h]er demeanor on the stand was straightfor-
ward and her answers to questions were prompt and reasonable"); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Wittman, 813 F. Supp. 1287, 1304 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (noting that the witness
was "straightforward and credible" and did not give "oblique answers").
127. See, e.g., United States v. Adames, 56 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The district
court heard [the witness's] testimony, observed his demeanor and determined that he was
a credible witness."); United States v. Costillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 1989) (up-
holding a trial court's finding that, after observing his demeanor, the witness was credi-
ble); NLRB v. Boyer Bros., Inc., 448 F.2d 555, 561 (3d Cir. 1971) (mentioning that the
trial examiner rejected part of witness's testimony concerning unfair labor practices be-
cause of her "poor" demeanor); Jenkins v. Beto, 442 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The
district court who heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor found that the ap-
pellant was not a credible witness.").
128. See, e.g., NLRB v. AMFM of Summers County, Inc., Nos. 95-1323 and 95-1812,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14894, at *11 (4th Cir. June 20, 1996) (per curiam) (upholding the
ALJ's finding that the witness was credible, "based on her demeanor and collaborating
evidence"); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 507 v. Robert Carlson Plumbing, Inc., Nos. 93-
1179 and 93-1484, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 624, at *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 1994) (discussing the
judge's finding that the witness was not credible, which was based on the witness's de-
meanor and his prior inconsistent statements); United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067,
1071 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that due to inconsistencies among the witness's written
statement, testimony and general demeanor on the stand, the court did not find her to be
a credible witness); see also, e.g., Kimbrough v. Beto, 412 F.2d 981, 987 (5th Cir. 1969). In
Kimbrough, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's credibility determination and stated
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ings involving the witness's demeanor carry more weight when based in
terms of observed behavior; however, the trier of fact is not required to
detail the witness's specific physical appearance or conduct that led to
the credibility determination.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As a result of the great deference afforded to the credibility findings
based on the witness's demeanor by fact-finders, many have attempted
to quantify the usefulness of such evidence in ascertaining the truth.
More than twenty years ago, judges argued eloquently that demeanor
credibility findings are an unreliable but necessary part of the litigation
process.129 This argument holds that demeanor is only one factor, and
perhaps the least reliable factor, in the ultimate finding of credibility, and
must be weighed with the internal consistency of what the witness is
saying and the level of consistency of the testimony with other evidence
in the record.
Over the last decade or so, several commentators have looked to em-
pirical evidence in studying the reliability of demeanor evidence. Many
of these commentators have concluded that demeanor findings based on
visual observations are generally of little use in determining the witness's
credibility." ' One such commentator went so far as to conclude that all
demeanor evidence is essentially worthless. 3'
A. The Wellborn Article
Psychologists have investigated whether demeanor can be effectively
used to determine whether a person is lying. In an influential article,
Professor Olin G. Wellborn III found that "[w]ith impressive consis-
that:
That conclusion would have been arrived at from his demeanor alone. In addi-
tion, his record of felony convictions showed that he was just a rank hoodlum. It
was plain that he had no integrity or sense of social responsibility, that he was
ruthless and would be willing to swear to anything, no matter how false, to get
out of the penitentiary.
Id.
129. See Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1084 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Duniway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[M]uch that is thought and said
about the trier of fact as a lie detector is a myth or folklore.").
130. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1200; Margaret A. Lareau & Howard R.
Sacks, Assessing Credibility in Labor Arbitration, 5 THE LAB. LAW. 151, 155 (1989); Mi-
chael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 243, 245 (1988); Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1104 (1991); see also generally Uviller,
supra note 26.
131. Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1075.
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tency, the experimental results indicate that.., ordinary people cannot
make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness.
On the contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of de-
meanor diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility
judgments.' 13
2
Under this view, the witness's credibility should be determined not on
the witness's demeanor, but on the witness's accuracy of perception,
memory, and ability to recount his story. Supporters of Professor Well-
born's theory contend that the experimental evidence suggested that a
witness's appearance and nonverbal behavior determined neither the ac-
curacy nor the sincerity of a witness's beliefs."'
Professor Wellborn argues that there are three categories of nonverbal
"channels" that make up a witness's demeanor: face, body, and voice.14
Professor Wellborn's study of demeanor evidence produced several con-
clusions including: (1) "ordinary observers do not benefit from the op-
portunity to observe nonverbal behavior in judging whether someone is
lying," (2) observation of facial behavior "diminishes the accuracy of lie
detection," and (3) a transcript of testimony provides better clues than
"paralinguistic" clues such as the witness's voice.
Some of Professor Wellborn's data, however, seem to provide con-
flicting findings!' 6 One such study divided credibility finders into three
groups: those who watched an interview of a witness; those who only
heard the recording of the witness's testimony; and those who only read
the transcripts.37 The watchers had a deception detection accuracy aver-
aging 58%, and the listeners and readers both had an accuracy averaging
132. Id. More than 30 law reviews have cited the Wellborn article, including John G.
Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the
Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 259 n.340 (1999); Richard 0.
Lempert, Built on Lies: Preliminary Reflections on Evidence Law as an Autopoietic Sys-
tem, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345 n.6 (1998); Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural
Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect Victims and Witnesses: An Examina-
tion of the Anonymity Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, 41 HOw. L.J. 155, 176 n.139 (1997).
133. See Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1166 n.52 ("An observer cannot detect deceit by
any means if it does not exist. If a witness is convinced of the veracity of his statements,
'telltale indicators' that he is lying should not be apparent.").
134. Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1078.
135. Id. at 1088.
136. For a vigorous dissent to Professor Wellborn's findings, see Michael L. Seigel,
Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV.
893, 906 n.43 (1992). In disparaging all demeanor evidence, Professor Wellborn dis-
missed, without merit, the evidence showing that several vocal clues can assist the fact-
finder in detecting deception. See Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1165 n.46.
137. See Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1082.
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77% 1
Another study used individuals who viewed "episodes" under the fol-
lowing four conditions: (1) facial, verbal, and paralinguistic cues; (2) ver-
bal and paralinguistic cues (audio with no video); (3) facial and verbal
cues (audio with a dubbed voice); and (4) facial cues (silent videos).139
This study revealed that the first three groups were equally accurate, but
that the fourth group's "accuracy fell to the chance level."1'4 Professor
Wellborn observed a third study that found little difference in accurately
determining credibility among live, video, or transcript testimony; how-
ever, where the trier of fact heard just the audio of the testimony, correct
credibility findings were comparatively evasive.141 Further, a fourth study
showed that the fact-finder's accuracy in determining credibility was
highest when the fact-finder was afforded the opportunity to observe all
of the demeanor (color, head, body, and audio).,
Based on this "available evidence," Professor Wellborn found that:
Strictly with regard to accuracy of credibility judgments, the
available evidence indicates that legal procedures could be im-
proved by abandoning live trial testimony in favor of presenta-
tion of deposition transcripts. Transcripts are probably supe-
rior to live testimony as a basis for credibility judgments
because they eliminate distracting, misleading, and unreliable
nonverbal data and enhance the most reliable data, verbal con-
tent.
14 1
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1083.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1084. This study conflicts with the study described at supra text accom-
panying notes 137-38.
142. See id. at 1085.
143. Id. at 1091. In a surprising construction of the law, Professor Wellborn appears
to argue that both Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Ral-
eigh on treason charges did not rely on the issue of the witness's demeanor. See id. at
1093. My reading of both cases leads me to the conclusion that the witnesses' demeanor
was, at the very least, a part of the fray. In Coy, the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault on two thirteen year-old girls. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014. At trial, a screen allowed
the defendant to see the girls testifying but blocked their views of him. See id. The Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment "guarantees the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses." Id. at 1016. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the
majority, specifically relied on the opportunity to see the witness's demeanor as a reason
for the Confrontation Clause:
The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes
upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will
draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-to-face confrontation serves
much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause
that we have had more frequent occasion to discuss-the right to cross-examine
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The use of mere transcripts to determine facts would weaken the
power of the fact-finder. Despite his distrust of the use of demeanor
evidence, Professor Wellborn wisely suggests that to propose to abandon
live testimony is "both unrealistic and illogical," because the right of con-
frontation is a due process requirement in both criminal and many civil
cases, and is imbedded in our legal tradition.'" Furthermore, live testi-
mony may have a deterrent effect, as it may prevent the dishonest wit-
nesses from testifying untruthfully, and thus, increases the acceptability
of trial outcomes. 145 Disregard for a trial court's demeanor finding would
impair confidence in the trial court and may, in turn, multiply appeals.
However, Professor Wellborn does propose disregarding findings based
on the witness's demeanor that the record shows are clearly incorrect. 4
B. Blumenthal Article
Criticism of the Wellborn article does not mean that there is no reli-
able empirical evidence of the effect of demeanor on credibility. In what
appears to be a knowledgeable analysis of the empirical research of the
effect of demeanor on credibility, psychologist Jeremy A. Blumenthal
finds that deception clues are present more often in the voice than in the
the accuser; both "ensur[e] the integrity of the factfinding process."
Id. at 1019-20 (emphasis added) (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)); see
also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) (arguing that the Confrontation
Clause "permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of
the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility")
(citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). In discussing the 1603 trial against
Sir Walter Raleigh, Professor Wellborn stated that "[w]hen Raleigh demanded that his
accuser, Lord Cobham, be produced in person, Raleigh did not contemplate either that he
would cross-examine Cobham or that Cobham's demeanor would display the falsity of the
accusation." Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1093. In fact, Raleigh demanded to confront and
cross-examine Lord Cobham because Raleigh wanted his accuser present in the court-
room for a jury to see. See Richard H. Underwood, Perjury: An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 318 (1996). Raleigh even made a Biblical reference when he com-
plained of being condemned without a chance to examine his accuser. See id. Cross ex-
amination provides the fact-finder with an opportunity to judge the demeanor of the wit-
ness by providing a vehicle:
[Niot only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). Therefore, in demanding confronta-
tion and examination of Lord Cobham, Raleigh sought an opportunity to view the wit-
ness's demeanor in a live testimony.
144. Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1091.
145. See id. at 1092 (arguing that "[i]t is probably more important that the results of
litigation be accepted than that they be accurate").
146. See id. at 1096.
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face or rest of the body. 47 Empirical data led Blumenthal to conclude
that two of the leading visual clues associated with "perceived decep-
tion"-a witness's averted eyes and a decrease in smiling-were not sig-
nificantly present in "actual deception."' 8
Blumenthal posited that when deception actually occurred, a few vis-
ual clues increased, such as hand-to-face gestures, pupil dilation, and
shrugs, while the usual suspects of demeanor observations, such as grim-
aces or smiles, furtive glances, shifty gaze, and nervous blinking, actually
decreased.'49 By contrast, the research showed that deception clues were
found more often in voice"O than in facial or other visual expressions."'
Furthermore, Blumenthal stated that the more important the lie, the
more pronounced the auditory clues became, as head and body move-
ments decreased and voice clues increased."' Finally, subjects of the ex-
periments who were instructed "to concentrate on the speakers' tone of
voice were significantly more skilled at discriminating truths from lies."'53
Regardless of these interesting experiments, however, it is doubtful
whether this empirical evidence of the effect of demeanor on credibility
is, or should be, admissible on the question of its continuing use in the
courtroom.5 4 The classroom is not the courtroom. The conditions of the
psychological experiment do not have the ceremony, oath,' atmosphere,
147. See Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1193.
148. Id. at 1194.
149. See id.
150. "Voice" includes "speech errors, speech hesitations, response length, pitch, ir-
relevant information, [and] negative statements," all of which increased during deception.
Id. at 1193 & n.227. Researchers have found that the speed.and pitch of a witness's voice
while testifying affect a listener's perception of the witness's credibility, intelligence, and
persuasiveness. See Jeffrey D. Smith, The Advocate's Use of Social Science Research into
Nonverbal and Verbal Communication: Zealous Advocacy or Unethical Conduct?, 134
MIL. L. REV. 173, 175-76, 178-79 (1991). Subjects in the experiment equated high-pitched
voices with nervousness and less truthfulness than lower pitched voices, and believed that
quick speech was associated with more knowledgeable, trustworthy testimony. See id. at
175-76. In addition, "[p]articipants rated witnesses using the powerful style of speech as
more convincing, more competent, more intelligent, and more trustworthy than witnesses
using the powerless style." Id. at 180.
151. See Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1193.
152. See id. at 1196-97.
153. Id. at 1199.
154. See Green v. United States, 19 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1927) (rejecting a proposal
to test a witness's ability to identify a party by voice at trial because conditions in the
courtroom were not similar to the original context).
155. Professor Blumenthal disagrees with the holding in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970), which stated that the oath and confrontation of a live testimony impress
upon the witness "the seriousness of the matter" and guard "against the lie by the possi-
bility of a penalty for perjury." Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1182 & n.156.
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and institutional tradition of a courtroom and do not inspire the same
sincerity.
C. Remedies
Professor Wellborn concludes that twenty-five years of controlled ex-
periments, involving thousands of subjects, showed that ordinary people
do not possess the capacity to detect falsehood or error by observing the
witness's nonverbal behavior. 56 He suggests that, "[a]lthough the law
may have been wrong about the value of witness demeanor,.., the gen-
eral requirement of live testimony, the hearsay rule, and the right of con-
frontation have ample foundations apart from assumptions regarding the
value of demeanor." '157 Although Professor Wellborn determined that
empirical research indicated that a transcript is as good a basis for credi-
bility determinations as observing the witness's demeanor during live tes-
timony, the need to enhance the work done by the trial court provides a
basis to restrict appellate review of trial court factual findings. 58
To remedy his perceived imperfections of demeanor evidence, Profes-
sor Wellborn suggests several relatively minor changes. For instance, he
condoned a "liberalization of the rules of admissibility of depositions and
former testimony in civil cases," and more use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) and summary jury trials that do not employ live testi-
mony.159 Finally, Professor Wellborn argues for the vigilant adherence to
the rule that demeanor evidence alone may not serve as a basis for re-
jecting uncontradicted, disinterested testimony, and that disbelief of de-
meanor evidence may not support a finding to the contrary.' 6
Professor Blumenthal, by contrast, finds that "[i]t is unforgivable that
the legal system deliberately ignores demonstrated, relevant findings
156. See Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1104-05. There is evidence, however, that ordi-
nary people may be trained to observe and interpret nonverbal behavior. See infra notes
186-93 and accompanying text (discussing demeanor as a lie detector); see also Nancy
Clare Kehoe, Nonverbal Communication: A Comparative Study of Counselors and Non-
counselors, 98-99 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) (on file with
Boston College, Department of Education). Kehoe concluded that training does affect
significantly the ability to observe and interpret nonverbal behavior. See id. at 100.
157. Wellborn, supra note 9, at 1105.
158. See id. at 1094, 1105. Professor Wellborn explained that "[e]ven in instances
where an appellate court is in as good a position to decide as the trial court, it should not
disregard the trial court's [demeanor] finding[s], for to do so impairs confidence in the
trial courts and multiplies appeals." Id. at 1095-96 (quoting 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2586, at 737 (1971)).
159. Id. at 1105 (arguing that concerns over the accuracy of demeanor evidence in
these proceeds are "misplaced").
160. See id.
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about demeanor evidence and willfully adheres to an ineffectual tradi-
tional approach.",16' He concludes that empirical evidence shows that
"observers exposed to a witness's voice are able to judge deceit best,"'62
and recommends that "perhaps the ideal arrangement would be a screen
which hides the defendant from the witness (after the witness has been
told that the defendant can see her), and the witness from the jury, who
can then focus on her voice in assessing credibility!, 163 Professor Blu-
menthal also recommends that jury instructions be amended in order to
focus attention on those physical clues that have been shown by empiri-
cal research to be reliable indicators of deceit, such as the sound of a
witness's voice. 64
D. Lessening Due Process to Achieve Psychological Benefits
Proponents of eliminating the use of demeanor in a determination of
witness credibility believe that empirical research, based on principles of
psychology, proves the unreliability of assessing the witness's demeanor
for that purpose. In response to those perceived psychological benefits,
other areas of evidence law have changed in recent years as a result of
minimizing due process restrictions.
Fundamental changes in common law procedure must, however, be
slow and studied,' 66 and we should be extremely careful in making any
change in the law of credibility determinations based on demeanor evi-
dence. It has been a long-standing proposition that the opportunity to
observe a witness's demeanor during live testimony is part of the com-
mon law credibility determination and ensures the integrity of the fact-
161. Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 1204.
162. Id. at 1202-03.
163. Id. at 1202.
164. See id. at 1201.
165. A primary example of this has emerged in the case of child abuse. Cf. Allen D.
Cope, Alabama's Child Hearsay Exception, 47 ALA. L. REV. 21, 215 (1995) (noting the
increase of child abuse cases in recent years). Where an allegedly abused child would suf-
fer emotional distress by testifying in the presence of the accused, legislatures have at-
tempted to safeguard the psychological well-being of the child victim. Some of these
cases have involved allegations of child abuse in schools and day care centers, and politi-
cal pressure to secure convictions has resulted in extensive use of hearsay and the misuse
of interviewing procedures, leading to comparisons to Salem witch trials. See Margaret
A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 564-65 (1991); see also Jean Mon-
toya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interro-
gation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927, 927 n.2 (1993).
166. See 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881) (noting eloquently that "[tihe life of the law has not been logic; it has been experi-
ence").
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167finding process.
IV. TECHNOLOGY
Although the use of demeanor credibility findings must continue in
spite of the disquieting empirical evidence, modern techniques may im-
prove their quality.'68 As knowledge of human behavior advances, this
improved information can refine the adjudicatory process.
The bases for many of our rules of evidence may be found in observa-
tions of human behavior. 69 For instance, the common law's permissible
inference of guilt by flight, disqualification for infants, and hearsay ex-
ceptions for trustworthiness by admission of dying declarations, and
statements made against a party's interest, are all based in part on be-
havioral justifications. Social scientists have long studied human be-
havior to develop objective physiological techniques of determining
credibility, including hypnosis, voice stress analysis, truth serum (sodium
amytal), pupil dilation, and body language.7° The most widely known
scientific device used to detect truth is the polygraph or lie detector test.
As far back as 1906, a psychologist disparaged the legal profession for
its failure to adopt early lie detection tests, developed by German scien-
tists, in the courtroom.17' These early prototypes have developed into
more sophisticated polygraph tests that use elements of demeanor, such
as changes in the pulse rate, blood pressure, respiration, and electroder-
mal response, under the theory that a person telling a lie undergoes defi-
167. Cf Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) ("The perception that confronta-
tion is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to
it.").
168. One such technique is the advent of expert psychological testimony to assist the
fact-finder in her evaluation of an eyewitness's credibility. See United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir.
1984) (discussing the expert witness's testimony as to the reliability of the eyewitness's
identification). The use of such expert testimony is a response to the well documented
fears of misidentification by the eyewitness. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228
(1967) (acknowledging that "Itihe vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known").
169. In fact, empirical evidence developed in psychological tests suggests that the un-
truthful witness often gives clues of his deceit. See Steven I. Friedland, On Common
Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 185 &
n.116 (1990) ("[L]ying witnesses move their hands less, speak with higher pitched voices,
and, even though they may control their facial expression, may reveal their deceit through
foot and leg movements.").
170. See Colonel J. Jeremiah Mahoney & Captain Christopher C. vanNatta, Jurispru-
dential Myopia: Polygraph in the Courtroom, 43 A.F. L. REV. 95, 118 & n.111 (1997) (dis-
cussing "scientific endeavor[s] that purport[] to find truth or detect deception").
171. See Comments, The Use of Psychological Tests to Determine the Credibility of
Witnesses, 33 YALE L.J. 771, 772 (1924).
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nitely ascertainable physiological reactions. A person telling the truth,
on the other hand, theoretically shows only normal reactions. The pro-
cedure consists of attaching instruments to the subject's body and inter-
rogating the person, commencing with innocuous questions so as to es-
tablish the person's normal reactions, and proceeding to question the
subject about a crime of which he is suspected or other matters upon
which the interrogator seeks information.
A. Polygraph Admissibility
Frye v. United States,' 72 which created the first test for admitting scien-
tific evidence in United States courts, was also "the first reported deci-
sion involving the admissibility of psychological deception tests to detect
crime or determine the credibility of witnesses.' 77 The federal circuits
are split on the treatment and admissibility of a polygraph examiner's
expert opinion.
The Second, 74 Fourth , 5 Tenth, and District of Columbia' 7 Circuit
Courts maintain a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence. The Sixth,178
Eighth, 179 and Eleventh 80 Circuit Courts admit polygraph evidence only
if both parties stipulate to its use prior to administering the examination
and the trial judge determines that the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence are met. Also, the Eleventh Circuit permits poly-
graph evidence to be used to impeach or corroborate a witness's testi-
mony in the absence of a stipulation if the opposing party is adequately
172. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The law of admissibility of scientific evidence in
federal cases is now stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993) (holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of scientific
evidence in federal cases).
173. Recent Cases, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Admissibility of Deception Tests,
37 HARV. L. REV 1131, 1138 (1923).
174. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to admit
polygraph results into evidence "because the specific testimony here would not likely 'as-
sist the trier of fact"').
175. See United States v. Walker, 66 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table deci-
sion).
176. See United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1987).
177. See United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
178. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that
the Sixth Circuit has adopted a two-part test of relevance and probative value to deter-
mine the admissibility of polygraph evidence).
179. See Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 517, 519 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (mentioning
that the court did not "recede from the rule that polygraph examination results should not
be admitted absent stipulation").
180. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989).
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notified and given an opportunity to administer its own polygraph test.'8 '
The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits leave the admissibility determi-
nation under the Federal Rules of Evidence in the trial judge's sole dis-
cretion. 2 The Seventh Circuit holds that the accused had a substantive
right to admit the results of a polygraph examination to which the prose-
cutor stipulated previously.'83 The Third Circuit permits the introduction
of polygraph evidence in order to rebut a defendant's claim that his con-
fession was coerced.'8 The First Circuit permits the admission of poly-
graph evidence for reasons other than showing the substance contained
therein, such as for purposes of impeachment.
B. Demeanor as a Lie Detector
One of the factors the examiner uses in a polygraph test is his "clinical
impressions" of the subject during the pretest interview and the exami-
nation. To formulate his clinical impression, "the examiner considers the
subject's demeanor ('body language') as well as the recorded reactions of
the instrument.'" 6  The more accurate the clinical impression, the
greater the reliability of detection of deceit.
Dr. Paul Ekman, a psychologist at the University of California at San
Francisco, performed empirical research of physical clues and found a
high correlation between a detectable reaction and false information.'
87
Dr. Ekman determined that deception clues "may be shown in a change
in the expression on the face, a movement of the body, an inflection to
the voice, a swallowing in the throat, a very deep or shallow breath, long
pauses between words, a slip of the tongue, a micro facial expression, a
gestural slip."' 8
181. See id. Polygraph examiners contend that a properly administered polygraph test
detects deception with a 92% - 100% accuracy range; others suggest an accuracy range of
63% - 72%. See id. at 1533 n.12.
182. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th
Cir. 1995).
183. See McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 1981).
184. See United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987).
185. See United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433 (1st Cir. 1988).
186. Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 909
(1998).
187. See EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 77, at 39, 42-43, 46-47, 49.
188. Id. at 43. Dr. Ekman found that "[c]hanges in the voice produced by emotion are
not easy to conceal." Id. at 93. He noted that spotting deceit is very difficult when first
meeting a person because interpreting most clues of deceit requires previous acquain-
tance. See id. at 109. In addition, Dr. Ekman ascertained that some body movements,
specifically, grooming, massaging, rubbing, holding, pinching, foot tapping, or scratching,
2000]
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Dr. Ekman performed a series of empirical research tests to determine
whether the skill of demeanor lie detection can be taught.189 He found
that law enforcement officers for the United States Secret Service, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and other agencies, could detect liars 73% of
the time, that Los Angeles County Sheriffs scored 67%, federal judges
scored 62%, and that other law enforcement officers scored 51%."9 Dr.
Ekman concluded that "it is possible for some people to make highly ac-
curate judgments about lying and truthfulness without any special aids
such as slowed motion, repeated viewing, and the scoring of subtle
changes by either trained coders or computer-based measurements.'" 91
Neuroscientist Terrance Sejnowski and other scientists at the Salk In-
stitute in La Jolla, California "have developed a computer system that
has learned to read the rapidly changing expressions in a human face and
may one day be able to draw conclusions about the emotions that lurk
behind them."' 9 Eventually, the research done at Sejnowski's lab could
create a lie detector that is far more reliable than current polygraphs,
which measure reactions, such as heartbeat and sweating, that some
people can learn to master.1
93
C. Expert Scientific Testimony on Demeanor Credibility
Under the relaxed standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,19' courts may be more
amenable to expert testimony on demeanor evidence. In the trial courts'
discretion, polygraph evidence may be admitted through expert testi-
are not reliable signs of deceit. See id. at 109-10. More importantly, however, Dr. Ekman
concluded that witnesses may vary in the type of gestures they display when they lie, and
that the body produces automatic nervous system changes with emotional arousal that are
constant for a respective emotion, which could lead to deceit detection. See id. at 113-15
(discussing breathing, swallowing, sweating, blushing, blanching, and pupil dilation as
types of emotional arousal).
189. See, e.g., id. at 205; see also, e.g., Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can
Catch A Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913, 913-14 (1991).
190. See Paul Ekman et al., A Few Can Catch A Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 263, 263-
65 (1999); see also Guy Gugliotta, True or False: Can You Learn To Detect Lies? WASH.
POST, July 12, 1999, at A7; Erica Goode, To Tell The Truth, It's Awfully Hard To Spot A
Liar, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at Fl.
191. Ekman et al., supra note 190, at 265. But see id. (concluding, however, that "[i]t
is unlikely that judging deception from demeanor will ever be sufficiently accurate to be
admissible in the courtroom").
192. Frederic Golden, Lying Faces Unmasked: The Most Gifted Fibbers Can Fool Al-
most Anybody, But a New Computer Can Look Right Through Them, TIME, Apr. 5, 1999,
at 52.
193. See id. at 52-53.
194. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
[Vol. 49:903
2000] Demeanor Credibility
mony on eyewitness evidence.9 The accuracy rate for lie detection by a
properly administered polygraph test ranges from 64% to 98%.'"
Experts using demeanor evidence can learn to detect lies more than
70% of the time.' 97 Results would improve if aided by computer soft-
ware and a slow motion video of the witness's testimony.'9 Whether the
expert could assess a witness's truthfulness in a hectic trial may be more
difficult.'99 Even assuming that this process could meet the test for the
admissibility of expert scientific testimony, courts might reject it for
other reasons.2°
Judges and juries are expected to make credibility determinations,
sometimes based on demeanor testimony. Sweaty palms and shifting
eyes may be indicative of language and cultural differences rather than
fabrication. It is equally true that skillful liars may pass all demeanor
tests. Dr. Ekman's studies prove that demeanor detection skills may be
acquired by experience and learning, that there are some experts that
have specialized knowledge in this field, and that most laymen, including
judges, do not.20' Perhaps courts should be more receptive to scientific
195. See Hon. Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony
Under the Federal Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 396 (1999).
196. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-TM-H-15,
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION - A
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, 97 (1983). There is some evidence that polygraph results
have improved in recent years through the use of computer software programs that
evaluate polygraph charts. See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 914.
197. See Ekman et al., supra note 190, at 265, Table 2.
198. The expert's specialized knowledge could certainly assist the fact-finder in as-
sessing truthfulness from demeanor. This, however, is a complicated issue. Dr. Ekman
has identified 60 emblems of body movements and 46 face muscle movements that iden-
tify the speaker's emotions. See EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 77, at 98; Golden,
supra note 192, at 52; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 11 (analyzing 46 clues to de-
ception).
199. For a start, the judge might consider rearranging the courtroom so that the fact
and demeanor-finder can clearly see the witness's body movements. See Ekman et al.,
supra note 190, at 282. Dr. Ekman believes that the courts must have been designed by
someone who wanted to make it impossible to detect deceit from demeanor. The witness
testifies long after the incident, with many chances to prepare and rehearse, blunting
emotions associated with the story, allowing subtle or severe changes to memory through
leading questions, until a liar may even begin to believe the story, blunting detection. See
id. at 291-92.
200. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1993) (recog-
nizing that scientific evidence must be scientifically valid to have evidentiary reliability,
and must assist the trier of fact to determine a fact in issue); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (determining that the blood pressure deception test was not
scientifically recognized at the time, and, therefore, inadmissible).
201. The average judge does not rate at the top of those skilled in demeanor assess-
ment. See Golden, supra note 192, at 52.
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testimony that would help determine demeanor credibility 2  "
In United States v. Sessa, the court held that inadmissible testimony
by a psychologist who examined a coconspirator, the government's prin-
cipal witness againsi the defendant, was not helpful to the jury regarding
the witness's credibility or bias. Judge Weinstein stated that even if psy-
chological testimony on witness truthtelling could meet the Frye/Daubert
test for admissibility, as with the general refusal to admit polygraph re-
sults, there is a strong public policy against, inter alia, "the intolerable ef-
fect of potentially requiring the testimony of every defendant and every
witness to be bolstered or attacked."2 4 To mitigate Judge Weinstein's
objection to multiplying expert witnesses, expert testimony on demeanor
evidence could be limited to those cases where it is the sole evidence
upon which the determination could be made, as in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp.,2°5 and Getahun v. INS,2 6 or at
least where demeanor evidence is the only evidence offered on an im-
portant issue in a case.
V. CONCLUSION
When witness credibility is at issue, due process requires that the fact-
finder see and hear the witness testify. The witness's demeanor is evi-
dence of sincerity, character, and ability to testify accurately and plausi-
bly. Demeanor is composed of numerous factors and is difficult to ar-
ticulate. In order to preserve a record for appellate review, however,
202. Many courts still exclude expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness tes-
timony. See generally United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142 (5th Cir. 1998);
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has recog-
nized, however, the vulnerability of eyewitness testimony. See United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 229 (1967). It seems almost certain that expert testimony could help on that is-
sue. See Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology of
Memory, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1482 (1993) (reviewing HARRY N. MACLEAN, ONCE
UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND THE LAW (1993)); see also
Maureen A. Gorman, Evaluating Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Trials: Can Jurors
Use Help From Experts?, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 137, 142 (1987). The increasing admissi-
bility of expert witnesses to testify about the problems associated with eyewitness testi-
mony reveals judicial recognition of the dramatic improvement in psychological research
in the field of memory and perception. See Tom Schoenberg, Blink of an Eye, LEGAL
TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1999, at 1.
203. 806 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
204. Id. at 1068. Expert testimony will be admitted, however, regarding the medical
question of the inability to differentiate between truth and falsehood. See United States
v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
205. 175 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1949).
206. No. 98-2223, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10860, at *3-*4 (4th Cir. May 26, 1999) (per
curiam) (determining that the only evidence in the administrative hearing, the peti-
tioner's, was not credible).
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findings of credibility based on demeanor evidence must be supported by
observations of the witness's specific appearance or behavior.
Demeanor evidence, like eyewitness testimony, comes to us up the
long staircase of common law. Modern empirical tests indicate that both
types of evidence may be imperfect but inevitable, and a proper respect
for history requires that any change be studied and incremental. Fact-
finders should not hide their prejudices behind unassailable demeanor
findings. When other credibility factors do not appear in the record the
judge must not shy away from the duty to decide on credibility based on
the witness's demeanor. And, as the technology of making accurate de-
meanor findings progresses-just as polygraphs have progressed-expert
evidence on demeanor will be more welcome in the courts.
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